The Planniing and Problems of Clinical Trials Professor Ralston Paterson (Christie Hospital, Manchester) Clinical Trials in Malignant Disease: General Principles As applied to human disease the purpose of clinical trials is ordinarily held as being the provision of genuinely scientific comparisons between different treatments or different aspects of treatment. This immediately takes us into the problem of what is scientific. The standard trite answer is 'Science is measurement'. In a medical context this involves the designing of studies on patients of such a pattern that they will allow comparisons of results to be measured on standards as objective as are used in pure laboratory work, and which eliminate assessment of value through impression, intuition or opinion, except where such opinion can itself be measured. This purpose, however, has to be linked to the requirement that in the process no injustice should be done to a patient on either side of the trial. It is this last, the ethical element, which calls for clear thinking in the design ofany clinical trial, and which raises particular difficulties with malignant disease. In the background a tacit assumption is made that current practice can be held as representing the bestand therefore correctpractice in the light of existing knowledge and custom, and of the facilities available. Any person knowing of a better method than he is actually using, and not developing it, is ipso facto offering his patient less than the best. To mend that state of affairs requires no clinical trial.
We now come to the question of how these purposes are best achieved in the design of clinical trials affecting malignant disease, and of the problems which arise. The dominant and inescapable element here is that for the earlier curable malignant diseases the allocation of a patient to one or other of two alternative treatments may inevitably involve a life or death choice for that individual. The situation is much easier for assessment of palliative measures such as comparison between adrenalectomy and hypophysectomy. Then the balance of ethical stress is less critical.
Let us examine some of the consequences of this life or death situation. In the first place it is just not possible to explain to the patient, desirable though this be for the less lethal diseases. The ethical decision that either of two policies could be equally valid lies fairly and squarely on the responsible clinicians. It follows from this that no one concerned must have any ideaeven a prejudiced opinionas to which of two policies will prove the better. The ethics at this level are such that not only must two clearly defined policies be equally acceptable, but that every patient must be individually reviewed mentally before registration into the trial: 'Am I entirely happy that for that woman either of the treatments which she may get is equally applicable?' Once registered in, however, the patient must never be taken out.
One of the consequences of this situation is that it allows only relatively narrow contrasts, such as two different patterns of X-ray treatment. Then, because they are narrow, substantial numbers have to be foreseen if statistical significance is to be achieved.
The second important element to note is that the physician must know what has been done and it is utterly impossible to lay down in advance any detailed pattern of treatment. The double-blind approach is inapplicable. In malignant disease the contrast is really between two intended policies, not between two treatments. Moreover, to whichever side the patient is allotted, subsequent action must still be based on the actual situation as it develops and not to the initial statistical grouping. But for end results a patient continues to count with the allocated group as that was the intended policy.
On the technical side of how trials should be conducted the kernel of the whole story is that in some suitable way each patient is randomly allocated entirely by chance to one or other side of the study. In relation to this particular element it is vital to keep in mind that although we wisely use the camouflage term clinical trial, the process is in fact a clinical experiment and if it is to be of any value it must carry the full rigid discipline of good laboratory work, both in general prin-626 Proceedings ofthe Royal Society ofMedicine 18 ciple and in regard to all relevant minutik. Although I have in the past used simpler methods I would now ordinarily favour as the method of randomization the use of previously prepared envelopes on which the patient's name and identifying numbers are recorded before opening.
The used envelopes safely stored then become the only authoritative basic record for the material of the study.
If in cancer our ethical problems are difficult we have at least one technical advantage over our colleagues concerned with other diseases. Our end point, our result, is crystal clear, quite exact and quite inescapable. Alive or dead needs no definition.
Next we can look at the inter-pretation of results and the uses to which the information gained may be put. The main point to keep clearly in mind is that each study, once complete, gives an objective scientific answer which must be held as truth until otherwise disproved, provided that its technique is accepted as irreproachable. It is, however, only true in a strictly academic sense for the actual methods of treatment used, the category of patients accepted into the trial, and the centre or centres involved. In the end it will only be by the accumulation of many experiments cast in differing detail that broader principles will be built up which can be held as having been effectively demonstrated. Although, however, this perfectionist outlook is the only one which is academically permissible, in actual practice a much broader interpretation is entirely justified. What is true of a particular s-tudy is probably also true of any homologous or similar method.
There is another angle to this practical pragmatic application worth noting. According to conventional statistical practice the term 'significant' is applied only when the probabilities of differences being due to chance are less than 1: 20 (P = 0 05). With studies which are still reasonably practical this is very hard to achieve. Many findings differ at levels of 1:10 or thereabouts. Do we disregard these and condemn them as 'statistically insignificant'? It would be very unwise to do so. Two comparative observations which have only a 1 in 10 probability of being different merely by statistical chance are still a very valuable finding and give information on which one can justifiably base action.
With these several points of interpretation in mind what use can rightly be made in clinical practice of the findings of the many clinical trials becoming available to us both here and in the USA?
Many are negative in the sense that they fail to prove differences. Statistically it is said to be impossible to prove equality. But where good, well-designed studies with adequate numbers fail to prove a difference it is for working purposes a reasonable assumption that for any future patient the probable survival will be the same for either approach. Both approaches are therefore permissible and neither can be labelled wrong. The better choice will usually be that which is easier on the patient. Ordinarily if the choice be between doing something and not doing it, not doing it is the better choice. This is at times irksome to the desire to 'do something' but the temptation is to be resisted.
The issues are much clearer when we come to studies which show apparent differences of sufficient degree -I am avoiding the term 'statistically significant'. Before such a study was started it was not known which treatment was the better or it would not have been ethical to launch the study. A difference which must be accepted as real has been demonstrated. Let us not run away from the innate significance of this. Some individuals in the side showing lower survival are now dead who would have been alive had the toss of the coin put them in the other group. We can do nothing about these, but we can about future patients. If the study be accepted as sound, there is now proved a probable difference in value of the two approaches. One is better, the other worse. So it should be held for the present and until better contrary evidence be forthcoming that the findings of any positive study have to be accepted and put into clinical operation.
A clinical trial is difficult to plan and to organize for malignant disease, but it can be of immense value. It is one of the least expensive ways of adding to our ability to save lives. So it should not be neglected. Considerable trouble is justified to design and launch suitable studiesthe more the better.
Mr J L Hayward (Imperial Cancer Research Fund, London, and Guy's Hospital, London) Planning and Conducting Cancer Clinical Trials Rightly or wrongly we in this country are credited with initiating the controlled trial as a method of clinical evaluation. Michael Shimkin (1964), who was until recently Medical Statistician at the National Cancer Institute in the United States, comments as follows: 'A new phase of scientific medicine can be predicted through the acceptance of the techniques of designed clinical trials for obtaining answers to many vexing problems regarding cancer treatment.
For this advance we owe a debt to our British colleagues, for their pioneer role in the development ofclinical trials.' Thus perhaps we should assume a special responsibility to ensure that these clinical trials
